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Google’s Opening Statement

The Advertising Technology Industry Is Intensely Competitive With New Entrants All The Time

2023

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2003

Ad Tech Innovations Have Spurred 18x Economic Growth

Israel Rept. Fig. 7 (DTX 1828 (based on eMarketer data))

$20

$40

$60

$80

$100

$120

$140

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

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2018

2019

2020

2021

2022

U.S. display ad spending ($ billions)

U.S. Display Ad Spending, 2008-2022

Plaintiffs Cannot Prove Their

Alleged Relevant Markets

Refusing To Provide Comparable Access Is Per Se Legal And Competitive

Courts “should combine different products or

services into a single market when that combination

reflects commercial realities.”

Two-sided transaction platforms “facilitate a single,

simultaneous transaction between participants” and

are thus “best understood as supplying only one

product—transactions—which is jointly consumed.”

Ohio v. Am. Express Co.

, 585 U.S. 529, 544, 545 & n.8 (2018)

Ad Tech Is A Two-Sided Transaction Platform Connecting Buyers And Sellers

Ad Tech

(Advertisers)

(apps, social media, web

pages, connected TV,

game consoles)

Buyers of

Digital Ad

Space

Sellers of

Digital Ad

Space

Google’s Share In A Two-Sided Market Has Decreased Even As Its Revenue Has Increased

Israel Rept. Fig. 55 (DTX 1875); Fig. 115 (DTX 1928)

Google’s Approximate Share in a Single Two-Sided

Market for U.S. Display Advertising, 2008-2022

U.S Google Display Ad Revenue, 2008-2022

Share of U.S. display ad spending

U.S. Google display ad revenue ($ billion)

17%

25%

44%

45%

46%

45%

41%

40%

33%

30%

28%

26%

25%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

90%

100%

$0.4

$0.6

$1.4

$1.9

$2.3

$2.7

$3.1

$3.8

$4.2

$5.0

$6.2

$7.5

$8.9

$12.4

$13.4

$12

$15

Plaintiffs’ Complaint Alleged Three Markets For Tools For

“Open Web Display Advertising”

1. Publisher Ad Servers

282. Publisher ad servers for open web display advertising is a relevant antitrust product market. For simplicity,

this Complaint refers to these products as “publisher ad servers” or “ad servers.” Google offers DoubleClick for

Publishers, now part of the Google Ad Manager suite, as a product in this relevant market.

2. Ad Exchanges

290. The market for ad exchanges for indirect open web display advertising is a relevant antitrust product market.

For simplicity, this Complaint refers to these products as “ad exchanges.” Google offers AdX, now part of the Google

Ad Manager suite, as a product in this relevant market.

3. Advertiser Ad Networks

297. Advertiser ad networks for open web display advertising is a relevant antitrust market. An advertiser ad

network provides easy-to-use, self-service bidding tools that facilitate ad placement on open web display ad

inventory.

Pltfs’ Compl. ¶¶ 282, 290, 297

Plaintiffs’ Markets Are Gerrymandered To Carve Out Relevant Substitutes

Carves Out In-House Ad Tech Like Amazon.com,

Facebook.com, and Instagram.com

“Open”

Carves Out Ad Tech When Used to Place Ads on

Apps and Connected TV

“Web”

Carves Out Ad Tech When Used to Place Native Ads or In-

Stream Video Ads Like on YouTube

“Display”

Carves Out Ad Tech When Used for Direct Deals

“Indirect”

Plaintiffs’ Markets Carve Out The Same Ad From The Same Advertiser

Placed On The Same Article By The Same Tool Viewed By The Same User

OUT

Plaintiffs’ Markets Included Ads On Amazon.com Until October 2015, When

Amazon Started Using Its Own In-House Ad Server

OUT

MID-OCTOBER 2015

Plaintiffs’ Expert Says The Markets Are Ad Tech Tools But Never Analyzed

Competition For The Tools And Artificially Limited Market Share Calculations

Says Market Defined

by Tools, Not Ads

“When I get to market

definition,

I’ll be focusing

on the tools

used to

transact those digital

advertisements” but “

the

relevant product

markets do not include

the underlying display

advertisements

.”

Dep. 56:4-58:7; 66:14-67:8

Then Counts Only

“Open-Web Display”

Ads

Admits No Tools Serve

Only “Open-Web

Display” Ads

“For the purposes of

computing market

shares . . . ,

I restrict

attention to open-web

display transactions.

”

Rebuttal Rept. ¶ 140

Q. Do you know if there’s

any ad exchange that

facilitates advertising

only for open-web

display advertising?

A. Sitting here today,

can’t name a specific

one that I know

definitively does not

transact other forms

of digital advertising

than open-web

display.

Dep. at 105:1-7

Never Analyzed What

Motivates Choice of

Tools

“

It's difficult for me to

tell you definitively

what a publisher does

or does not take into

account.

I'm not a

publisher.”

Dep. at 122:8-18

“

I cannot definitively

state what an

advertiser does or

does not consider

all when making their

decisions.”

Dep. at 122:20-123:21

Plaintiffs Want Google To Divest Even Where There Is No Monopoly Power

Actual Market Share

for Ad Exchanges in the US (Based on Spend)

Plaintiffs’ Alleged Market Share

for Ad Exchanges in the US (Based on Spend)

34%

Google

66%

Others

17%

Google

83%

Others

Lee Rebuttal Rept. Fig. 13 (PTX 1384); Israel Rept. Fig. 136 (DTX 1949)

Google’s Conduct Is

Per Se Legal

Refusing To Provide Comparable Access Is Per Se Legal And Competitive

“Firms may acquire monopoly power by establishing an infrastructure

that renders them uniquely suited to serve their customers.

Compelling such firms to share the source of their advantage is in

some tension with the underlying purpose of antitrust law, since it

may lessen the incentive for the monopolist, the rival, or both to invest

in those economically beneficial facilities. Enforced sharing also

requires antitrust courts to act as central planners, identifying the

proper price, quantity, and other terms of dealing—a role for which

they are ill suited.”

Verizon Commc’ns Inc.

Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP

540 U.S. 398, 407-08 (2004)

Refusing To Provide Comparable Access Is Per Se Legal And Procompetitive

“A firm with no duty to deal in the wholesale market has no

obligation to deal under terms and conditions favorable to its

competitors.”

Pac. Bell Tel. Co

. v.

linkLine Commc’ns, Inc

., 555 U.S. 438, 450-51 (2009)

“Forcing firms to help one another would also risk reducing the

incentive both sides have to innovate, invest, and expand—

again results inconsistent with the goals of antitrust.” “If forced

sharing were the order of the day” courts would have to

“become ‘central planners,’ a role for which we judges lack

many comparative advantages and a role in which we haven't

always excelled in the past.”

Novell, Inc.

Microsoft Corp.

, 731 F.3d 1064, 1073 (10th Cir. 2013)

Robin Lee

Plaintiffs’ Complaint Is That Google Didn’t Give Its Rivals “Comparable” Access

Plaintiffs’ Expert

Report ¶ 12(3)

The Search Court Rejected Claims That Mirror Plaintiffs’ Claims Here

Plaintiffs claim “Google ignored Microsoft’s repeated pleas to integrate auction time

bidding (ATB), a feature that permits advertisers to change their bid strategies in

real time during auctions.”

“The court is unpersuaded that Google’s SA360 conduct falls outside the ‘no-duty-

to-deal’ framework.” “The concerns that animate the no-duty-to-deal principle are

equally applicable here. Primarily, adjudicating Plaintiff States’ claim would require

the court to act as a ‘central planner’ that endeavors to identify the proper ‘terms of

dealing.’

Trinko

, 540 U.S. at 408. Their claim requires grappling with a host of

questions that the court is ill-equipped to handle.” “And those thorny questions

foreshadow the challenges the court would face in administering a remedy. Any

relief presumably would require Google to ensure feature parity on SA360 now and

into the future. A favorable outcome for Plaintiff States thus would mire the court in

Google’s day-to-day operations.”

United States v. Google

, 2024 WL 3647498, at *129, *131 (D.D.C. Aug. 5, 2024)

Sellers And Buyers Are Free To Choose Multiple Ad Tech Tools And They Do

Israel Rept. Fig. 85 (DTX 1902); Fig. 88 (DTX 1904)

29%

25%

31%

16%

# of buying tools

Buyers Use Multiple Buying Tools, 2022

10%

18%

67%

# of exchanges

Sellers Use Multiple Exchanges, 2022

All of Google’s Conduct Had a

Valid Business Purpose

Plaintiffs Must Prove Google Had No Valid Business Purpose

“To satisfy this burden,” a Plaintiff “must show that a jury could

find no valid business reason or concern for efficiency in the”

Defendant’s “choice.”

Oksanen

Page Mem’l Hosp.

, 945 F.2d 696, 710 (4th Cir. 1991) (en banc)

The two elements of a Section 2 monopolization claim are:

“(1) the possession of monopoly power in the relevant market

and (2) the willful acquisition or maintenance of that power as

distinguished from growth or development as a consequence

of a superior product, business acumen, or historic accident.”

United States v. Grinnell Corp

., 384 U.S. 563, 570-71 (1966)

Google Sought To Create Value For Advertisers, Publishers, And Users

DTX 29 at 7

April 23, 2008

Google Did Make Its Products Interoperable With Rivals

GAM (Ad Server)

100+ Exchanges (Including Header Bidding)

AdX Direct Tags

Any Non-Google Publisher Ad Server

GAM (Ad Exchange)

100+ Buying Tools

DV360 + Google Ads (AwBid)

100+ Exchanges

Valid Business Purposes Included Increasing Publisher Revenue

DTX 80 at 2

February 23, 2011

Government Witnesses Contradict Plaintiffs’ Case

In 2024, This Is The Commercial Reality

Integrated

Technology

Streaming

Gaming

Retail Media

Social

A.I.

Google Opening Statement

Prompt to Clone This Google Opening Statement

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