Impacts
of
Corporate
Code
of
Conduct
on
Labor
Standards:
A
Case
Study
of
Reebok’s
Athletic
Footwear
Supplier
Factory
in
China
Xiaomin
Yu
ABSTRACT.
This
study
examines
the
social
impacts
of
labor-related
corporate
social
responsibility
(CSR)
poli-
cies
or
corporate
codes
of
conduct
on
upholding
labor
standards
through
a
case
study
of
CSR
discourses
and
codes
implementation
of
Reebok
–
a
leading
branded
company
enjoying
a
high-profiled
image
for
its
human
rights
achievement
–
in
a
large
Taiwanese-invested
ath-
letic
footwear
factory
located
in
South
China.
I
find
al-
though
implementation
of
Reebok
labor-related
codes
has
resulted
in
a
‘‘race
to
ethical
and
legal
minimum’’
labor
standards when notoriously inhumane and seriously
illegal
labor
rights
abuses
were
curbed,
Chinese
workers
were
forced
to
work
harder
and
faster
but,
earned
less
payment
and
the
employee-elected
trade
union
installed
through
codes
implementation
operated
more
like
a
‘‘company
union’’
rather
than
an
autonomous
workers’
organization
representing
worker’
interests.
In
order
to
explain
the
paradoxical
effects
of
Reebok
labor-related
codes
on
labor
standards,
I
argue
the
result
is
determined
by
both
structural
forces
and
agency-related
factors
embedded
in
industrial,
national
and
local
contexts.
To
put
it
shortly,
I
find
the
effectiveness
of
Reebok
labor-
related
codes
is
constrained
not
only
by
unsolved
tension
between
Reebok’s
impetus
for
profit
maximization
and
commitment
to workers’ human rights, but also by hard-
nosed
competition
realities
at
marketplace,
and
Chinese
government’s
insufficient
protection
of
labor
rights.
De-
spite
drawing
merely
from
a
single
case
study,
these
findings
illuminate
key
determinants
inhibiting
the
effectiveness
of
labor-related
CSR
policies
or
codes
in
upholding
labor
standards,
and
hence
two
possible
way-
outs
of the deadlock: (1) sharing cost for improving labor
standards
among
key
players
in
global
supply
chain;
and
(2)
combining
regulatory
power
of
voluntary
codes
and
compulsory
state
legislations.
KEY
WORDS:
athletic
footwear
industry,
China,
cor-
porate
codes
of
conduct,
corporate
social
responsibility,
labor
standards,
Reebok,
trade
union,
wages
Introduction
Several decades of neoliberal economic globalization
has
enabled
global
capital
to
flow
more
freely
and
swiftly
across
national
borders,
especially
to
low-
waged
developing
countries,
to
reap
greater
profits.
However,
manufacturing
workers,
especially
those
working
in
labor-intensive
industries,
increasingly
experience
a
significant
deterioration
of
labor
stan-
dards.
Extensive
media
exposures
of
notorious
labor
practices
in
global
factories
have
remade
the
word
‘‘sweatshop’’
a
household
item.
Revealing
a
broad
social
opposition
to
the
detri-
mental
effects
of
economic
globalization
on
labor
standards,
the
middle
and
late
1990s
witnessed
the
simultaneous
growth
of
anti-sweatshop
campaigns
and
corporate
governance
reform,
which
cultivated
a
new
enthusiasm
for
corporate
social
responsibility
(CSR)
in
global
business
community.
Many
large
brand-name
corporations
of
the
developed
world
have adopted corporate codes of conduct to regulate
labor practices of their overseas suppliers. In general,
corporate codes of conduct are written statements of
principle
or
policy
serving
as
the
expression
of
a
commitment to particular enterprise conduct (Diller,
I
would
like
to
thank
three
anonymous
referees
for
helpful
comments on earlier version of this article. I also would like to
express
my
appreciation
to
professor
Pun
Ngai,
for
her
con-
tinuous
guidance and support during the work
on this
article.
Journal
of
Business
Ethics
(2008)
81:513–529
Springer
2007
DOI
10.1007/s10551-007-9521-2
1999).
A
recent
World
Bank
study
estimates
that
there
are
1,000
corporate
codes
in
existence
today
stipulating
the
labor,
human
rights,
and
environ-
mental
requirements
for
suppliers.
1
Codes
of
con-
duct
regarding
labor
standards
usually
specify
norms
and
rules
by
which
to
evaluate
labor
practices
at
workplace
(O’Rourke,
2003).
Currently,
most
labor-related codes of conduct concentrate in labor-
intensive industries. Diller (1999)’s study of 215 such
codes
reveals
that
these
codes
are
most
likely
to
be
found in industries of textile, clothing, and footwear
and
also
in
toy,
food
and
beverage
industries.
Although the content and format of these codes vary
considerably,
the
bulk
of
existing
codes
seek
to
base
themselves
on
core
conventions
of
International
Labor
Organization
(ILO),
including
prohibitions
on
child
labor,
forced
labor,
and
discrimination
in
respect
of
employment
and
occupation,
and
pro-
tection
of
freedom
of
association
and
collective
bargaining
and
other
basic
principles
regarding
the
protection of health and safety, wages and hours, and
treatment
of
women
(Tsogas,
2001;
O’Rourke,
2003).
Impacts
of
CSR
policies
or
corporate
codes
of
conduct
have
become
objects
of
studies
of
different
disciplines.
Noticeably,
majority
of
existing
studies
are
contributed
by
business
and
management
scholars,
who
most
often
conduct
research
on
rela-
tionship
between
corporation
social
performance
and
corporation
financial
performance,
aiming
to
provide
theoretical
and
practical
orientations
to
corporations
on
how
to
pursue
long-term
profit-
ability
with
a
CSR
agenda
2
.
As
claimed
by
many
CSR
theorists,
a
positive
effect
of
strategic
CSR
activities
on
profitability
could
be
realized
through
various
competitive
advantages:
enhanced
brand
value and reputation; closer links with customers and
greater
awareness
of
their
needs;
higher
employee
morale,
and
hence
higher
productivity;
good
rela-
tions with government and communities; better risk
and crisis management (Berman, et
al., 1999; Lantos,
2002; Mahon and Wartick, 2003; Jones et
al., 2005;
Siltaoja,
2006).
However,
until
recently,
there
are
much
less
academic
research
on
social
impacts
of
labor-related
CSR
policies
or
codes
–
for
example,
their
effec-
tiveness
in
combating
sweatshop
abuses
and
upholding
labor
standards
(Elliott
and
Freeman,
2003;
Sethi,
2003;
Esbenshade,
2004),
transforming
employment
relations
(Frenkel,
2001;
Frenkel
and
Kim,
2004;
Pun,
2005;
Sum
and
Pun,
2005;
Wang,
2005),
or
revitalizing
labor
movement
(Frundt,
2004;
Prieto-Carro´n,
2004;
Armbruster-Sandoval,
2005;
Rodriguez-Garavito,
2005;
Ross,
2006).
Existing
studies
on
social
impacts
of
labor-related
CSR
policies
or
codes
conducted
in
different
industrial settings
(e.g., apparel, toy, sportswear) and
national or local contexts (e.g., in Latin American or
Asian countries) draw a similar conclusion that codes
of
conduct
have
potential
in
curbing
the
most
im-
moral
and
inhumane
violations
of
workers’
rights
which
frequently
are
working
conditions-related
issues
such
as
child
labor,
sexual
harassments,
cor-
poral punishments, or occupational safety and health,
while provide no solution to problems of low wages,
long
working
hours
and
workers’
rights
to
freedom
of
association
and
collective
bargaining.
However,
the
majority
of
existing
researches
are
descriptive
in
nature,
offering
no
well-developed
analytical
framework
for
deeper
explanatory
investigation
of
the complexity of social results of implementation of
labor-related
CSR
policies
or
codes.
This
article
aims
to
fill
the
research
gap,
by
developing
an
analytical
framework
consisting
of
a
matrix
of
interrelated
structural
forces
and
agency-
related
factors
embedded
in
contexts
at
industrial,
national,
and
local
levels.
At
industrial
level,
I
examined
how
codes
effectiveness
in
upholding
labor
standards
are
affected
simultaneously
by
con-
tent
stringency
of
labor-related
codes,
discrepancy
between
corporation’s
sourcing
policy
and
labor-
related
codes,
and
competition
trends
at
market-
place.
At
national
and
local
levels,
I
explore
how
regulation and intervention
of central and local state
on
industrial
relations
impact
workplace
labor
practices and implementation of labor-related codes.
Basing on this analytical framework, I conduct an
empirical
and
explanatory
study
of
implementation
of
labor-related
codes
adopted
by
Reebok,
a
top
brand-name company in the global athletic footwear
industry, at one of Reebok’s major footwear supplier
factory
located
in
Fuzhou
city,
Fujian
province
of
China.
The
representativeness
of
this
case
study
lies
in following aspects. Firstly, since the 1980s, athletic
footwear
industry
has
been
criticized
most
inten-
sively
by
journalists
3
and
anti-sweatshop
activists,
and
consequently
has
become
a
leading
industry
in
areas
of
CSR
and
codes
4
.
Secondly,
Reebok
is
514
Xiaomin
Yu
selected
for
the
case
study
because
the
company
has
achieved
a good reputation for its long-term human
rights
efforts
and
has
become
a
corporate
leader
in
contemporary
CSR
movement
against
sweatshops
abuses.
5
A
close
examination
of
how
Reebok
deals
with sweatshop labor abuses in its supplying factories
enables
a
critical
analysis
of
the
effects
of
‘‘strategic
CSR’’ formula driven by commercial motivation for
long-term profitability on improving labor standards.
Thirdly,
China
is
the
world
largest
production
center
of
global
athletic
footwear
industry
6
and
received
the
most
intensive
criticism
of
sweatshop
labor
abuses
over
the
past
several
decades.
7
More-
over,
since
the
late
1990s,
China’s
labor-intensive
export
processing
industries,
especially
athletic
footwear
industry
has
become
the
lab
of
various
labor-related
CSR
policies
or
codes,
providing
an
ideal
site
for
examining
the
implementation
and
effectiveness
of
codes.
My
empirical
research
was
conducted
during
2002–2005
at
Reebok’s
second
largest
footwear
supplier
factory
in
China
which
is
referred
to
anonymously
as
Fortune
Sports
(FS)
in
this
article.
Data
was
collected
through
three
kinds
of
research
methods
–
participant
observation,
in-depth
inter-
views,
and
documentary
reviews.
I
started
field-
work
at
FS
in
October
of
2002,
observing
the
election
process
of
FS
trade
union.
In
the
following
three
years,
to
balance
perspectives
of
parties
holding
diverse
positions
and
interests
in
imple-
mentation
process
of
Reebok
labor-related
codes,
I
conducted
interviews
with
two
Reebok
human
rights
managers
in
China,
two
FS
mangers,
six
FS
production
line
supervisors,
two
officials
of
local
branches
of
the
All
China
Federation
of
Trade
Unions
(ACFTU),
9
FS
trade
union
committee
members,
and
13
FS
production
workers.
This
article
also
draws
evidences
from
documentary
re-
views
of
three
main
sources
–
company
documents,
online
databases,
and
websites.
The
article
proceeds
as
follows.
I
first
examine
Reebok’s human-right-focused CSR strategy with a
historical
perspective,
analyzing
the
contents
of
Reebok labor-related codes, commercial motivation
driving
Reebok
CSR
practices,
and
financial
results
of
Reebok
CSR
strategy.
And
then
I
move
to
investigate
how
implementation
of
Reebok
labor-
related
codes
has
changed
labor
process
and
work-
place
labor
standards
at
FS,
in
terms
of
working
conditions,
workers’
wages
and
workers’
rights
to
freedom
of
association.
Next,
the
article
explains
how
structural
forces
and
agency-related
factors
embedded
in
industrial,
national,
and
local
context
have resulted in ‘‘race to ethical and legal minimum’’
labor
standards
at
workplace
of
FS.
In
the
end,
I
suggest
two
possible
way-outs
to
redefine
and
reconstruct
a
balance
between
financial
and
social
outcomes
of
labor-related
CSR
policies
or
codes
of
conduct.
Reebok’s
human-right-focused
CSR
strategy
Reebok, a brand
established in
1895 and
distributed
in
the
U.S.
market
from
1979,
became
one
of
top
sportswear
brands
in
the
mid-1980s,
riding
high
on
the
aerobics
craze
and
women’s
fitness
movement.
In
2004,
Reebok
was
the
third-largest
sportswear
brands
in
the
world,
taking
up
9.6%
of
the
global
athletic
footwear
market
8
,
having
sales
of
about
US$
3785
million
and
a
net
profit
of
US$
192
million.
9
Reebok
is
a
long-term
believer
of
‘‘doing
better
by
doing
good’’,
a
business
idiom
created
by
‘‘strategic
CSR’’
or
‘‘strategic
corporate
philan-
thropy’’
theorists
(Lantos,
2001,
2002;
McAlister
and
Ferrell,
2002),
premising
that
the
firm’s
finan-
cial
and
social
objectives
are
compatible
rather
than
conflicting
and
better
social
responsibility
perfor-
mance
can
improve
long-term
financial
perfor-
mance.
Since
the
late
1980s,
Reebok
has
begun
to
employ a ‘‘strategic CSR’’ approach to portray
itself
as
a
conscientious
promoter
of
human
rights
and
labor
rights.
Reebok
launched
its
human-rights-focused
CSR
efforts
in
1988,
underwriting
about
$10
million
(approximately
50%
of
the
company’s
marketing
budget
of
1988)
to
sponsor
a
world
concert
tour
called
‘‘Human
Rights
Now!’’
to
honor
the
40th
anniversary
of
the
United
Nations
Universal
Dec-
laration
of
Human
Rights.
As
another
central
components
of
Reebok’s
CSR
strategy,
Reebok
Human Right Award played vital role in positioning
Reebok as a socially conscious company. Since their
inception in 1988, the awards have been given to 80
young
human
rights
activists
from
36
countries
by
2005.
10
Impact
of
Corporate
Code
of
Conduct
on
Labor
Standards
515
Reebok’s
leadership
in
the
contemporary
CSR
movement
against
sweatshop
abuses
In
1992
when
Reebok
was
publicly
criticized
by
human
rights
NGOs
for
using
contractors
violating
workers’
basic
rights,
Reebok
drafted
its
‘‘Human
Rights
Production
Standards.’’
As
the
first
copy
of
codes
of
conduct
in
sportswear
industry
incorpo-
rating
internationally
recognized
labor
rights
stan-
dards
(e.g.
core
conventions
of
ILO),
the
standards
include provisions on non-discrimination, no forced
or
child
labor,
freedom
of
association,
non-harass-
ment,
wages,
working
hours,
a
safe
workplace,
and
non-retaliation
policy.
11
Reebok
managed
to
achieve
an
industrial
lead-
ership
during
the
contemporary
CSR
movement
against
sweatshop
labor
abuses,
by
addressing
‘‘spotlight’’ issues proactively. For instance, worker’s
right
to
freedom
of
association
is
one
of
the
most
controversial issues negotiated between corporations
and
civil
society
groups
advocating
labor
rights
in
CSR movement. To convince the public of its CSR
leadership,
Reebok
took
bold
step
toward
aggres-
sively
addressing
workers’
right
to
freedom
of
asso-
ciation
in
Asian
countries
where
trade
unions
are
either
restricted
by
law
and
governments
or
manipulated by factory management. On March 23,
one
day
before
releasing
the
1999
Reebok
Human
Rights
Awards,
Reebok’s
CEO
Paul
Fireman
made
public
a
letter
to
Indonesian
President
B.J.
Habibie,
calling for the release of imprisoned Indonesian labor
rights activist, Dita Sari.
12
Two weeks later, Reebok
announced
the
successful
completion
of
a
pilot
training
program
by
the
American
Center
for
International
Labor
Solidarity
(ACILS),
to
teach
freedom
of
association
skills
to
workers
in
five
fac-
tories
making
Reebok
footwear
and
apparel
in
Indonesia.
13
Moreover,
in
the
past
few
years,
Reebok
launched
‘‘worker
representation
initia-
tives’’
in
Indonesia,
Thailand
and
China
under
the
banner
of
implementation
of
its
labor-related
codes
to
trumpet
its
commitment
to
workers’
rights
to
freedom
of
association.
Commercial
motivations
and
long-term
profitability
As
part
of
Reebok’s
human-rights-focused
CSR
strategy,
the
company’s
labor-related
CSR
efforts
are
marketing
tool
designed
to
enhance
its
repu-
tation
at
marketplace.
Reebok
is
clear
about
the
effects
of
CSR
activities
on
enhancing
reputation:
‘‘
As
concern
for
human
rights
issues
grows
among
con-
sumers,
particularly
younger
consumers,
we
believe
our
leadership
and
reputation
will
translate
into
greater
preference
for
our
brands
and
products.
’’
14
However,
before
enjoying
financial
benefits
at
marketplace,
Reebok
has
to
convince
the
public
of
its
sincerity
for
improving
workers’
human
rights
but
hide
its
real
commercial
motivations
skillfully.
As
Doug
Cahn,
director
of
human
rights
programs
of
Re-
ebok
said,
‘‘
Our
concern
for
human
rights...has
not
driven
us
in
our
marketing
programs.
It
is
a
commitment
to
corporate
social
responsibility,
and
a
way
for
us
as
a
company
and
as
individuals
to
give
back
to
the
world
in
which
we
live.
’’
15
Has
Reebok’s
long-term,
heavily
invested,
hu-
man-right-focused CSR efforts resulted in enhanced
profitability?
The
answer
is
absolutely
yes.
In
the
mid
1990s
when
Nike,
Reebok’s
main
competitor,
became
the
target
of
consumer
boycotts,
repeated
media
investigations,
and
international
protests,
Reebok
experienced
almost
none
of
these
things.
According to Sethi’s studies of Western news reports
on sweatshops and human right abuses during 1986–
2002,
Nike
accounted
for
61%
of
total
number
of
news
reports mentions,
while
Reebok
took
up
only
3.1%
(Sethi,
2003:35–6).
Consequently,
in
the
late
1990s
when
Nike
saw
declines
in
sales,
profits
and
stock
values,
Reebok
financially
benefited
from
being
less
targeted
by
negative
publicity
and
anti-
sweatshop
activism.
In
current
years,
the
long-term
effect
of
Reebok’s
CSR
efforts
on
profitability
be-
came
more
significant.
Partly
as
a
result
of
its
CSR
reputation enhanced during the past decade, Reebok
saw
its
profit
increasing
from
US$
11
millions
in
1999
to
US$
192
millions
in
2004.
16
Although
Reebok’s
CSR
strategy
proves
to
be
commercially
successful
in
terms
of
enhancing
rep-
utation and profitability, what is unclear is the social
results
of
the
company’s
CSR
efforts.
Specifically,
how
have
Reebok’s
labor-related
CSR
efforts
re-
sulted
in
similarly
impressive
improvement
of
labor
standards at workplace of its overseas suppliers? This
question
will
be
examined
through
a
case
study
of
implementation
of
Reebok
labor-related
codes
at
one of Reebok’s major footwear suppliers located in
China.
516
Xiaomin
Yu
Case
study:
the
impact
of
Reebok
labor-related
codes
on
labor
Standards
at
Fortune
Sports
Company
profile
of
Fortune
Sports
Fortune
Sports
(FS)
is
a
subsidiary
firm
of
a
large
Taiwanese
shoemaker
which
began
its
sport
shoes
manufacturing business in Taiwan in the early 1970s
and switched production across the Taiwan Straits to
China’s
Fujian
province
in
the
late
1980s
for
lower
cost of land, labor, energy, and transport. During the
1990s,
FS
grew
into
Reebok’s
second
largest
foot-
wear
supplier
in
China,
having
16
production
lines,
employing
over
10000
workers,
and
producing
about
10
millions
pairs
of
shoes
in
2002.
The FS is jointly managed by Taiwanese and local
Chinese
management.
Like
most
large-sized
Tai-
wanese-invested
firms,
FS
has
a
highly
hierarchical
management
structure,
with
ten
or
more
levels
of
supervision
of
workers
at
shop
floors.
High-rank
management
positions
are
all
filled
by
Taiwanese
men,
while
middle-rank
management
(department
managers
and
below)
are
all
local
Chinese
(largely
Fujian
local
people).
Junior
rank
managerial
staff
supervising
production
lines
(section
leader
and
lower) are largely women employees promoted from
shop
floors.
The
workforce
of
FS
consists
largely
of
young,
unmarried, migrant women from China’s poor rural
inland
provinces,
employed
basing
on
annual
con-
tract.
Over
90%
of
production
workers
are
female
and
over
95%
of
employee
are18–30-year-old.
Tayloristic
production
process,
coercive
labor
disciplines
and
rampant
labor
right
violations
The
manufacturing
of
athletic
shoes
continues
to
be
highly
labor
intensive
–
much
of
the
work
is
done
by
hand
and
the
degree
of
automation
is
low.
The
production
process
of
a
pair
of
athletic
shoes
includes
the
making
of
the
outsole,
the
midsole,
and
the
upper
respectively
and
then
assembling
these
three
main
parts
together.
FS
organizes
production
tasks
and
workers
into
sepa-
rate
departments:
cutting,
stitching,
assembling,
painting,
stock
fitting,
quality
controlling
and
warehousing.
In
order
to
ensure
productive
efficiency,
the
production
process
at
shop
floor
of
FS
is
organized
under
Tayloristic
principles
highlighting
the
effects
of ‘scientific’ management and tight labor control on
productive
efficiency.
Production
workers
are
paid
by
piece-rate,
basing
on
reaching
and
surpassing
the
quotas
set
by
industrial
engineers.
Visible,
coercive
and
punishment-oriented
labor
disciplinary
tech-
niques
are
employed
through
FS
managerial
hierar-
chies
to
ensure
labor
productivity.
FS
requires
all
workers
to
abide
by
company
regulations
(called
‘‘Employee
Handbook’’)
filled
with
disciplinary
codes
regulating
not
only
employees’
workplace
activities
but
also
workers’
everyday
life
behaviors
(e.g.,
clothing,
shoe-wearing,
or
eating).
Employees
violating
company
regulations
for
the
first
time
will
be
educated,
have
a
record
of
violation
for
the
sec-
ond,
be
warned
for
the
third,
have
a
record
of
de-
merit
for
the
fourth
and
be
fired
for
the
fifth
violations
in
a
year.
Besides
disciplining
workers
through
their
fear
of
losing
job,
deduction
of
wage
or
bonus
is
another
frequently-used
labor
discipline
method.
For
example,
workers’
full-attendance
bo-
nus will be deducted if they take leave for any reason
(including
take
sick
leave).
Not
surprisingly,
before
Reebok
required
FS
to
reform
labor
practices
complying
with
its
labor-re-
lated
codes
in
late
1990s,
serious
labor
rights
viola-
tions
occurred
at
shop
floor
of
FS,
including:
Extremely
long
overtime
working
China
Labor
Law
states
that
standard
working
hour
should
be
40
h
per
week
and
overtime
must
be
voluntary
and can amount to
no more than 3
h in
a
day,
36
h
a
month.
It
also
requires
that
workers
should
be
given
at
least
one
rest
day
per
week.
However,
during
the
whole
1990s,
monthly
over-
time working hours taken by production workers of
FS
normally
reached
104–128
h,
obviously
exceed-
ing
China’s
legal
maximum
overtime
working
hours.
It
was
also
common
for
FS
workers
to
be
punished
by
wage
deductions
for
refusing
to
work
overtime.
Insufficiently
compensated
overtime
working
China
Labor
Law
stipulates
employer
should
pay
150%
of
the
normal
rate
as
overtime
compensation
during weekdays, 200% on Saturday or Sunday, and
300%
on
statutory
holidays.
However,
at
shop
floor
Impact
of
Corporate
Code
of
Conduct
on
Labor
Standards
517
at
FS,
best
majority
of
production
workers
earned
piece-rate
wages,
not
being
paid
at
proper
overtime
compensation
rates.
Occupational
safety
and
health
problems
The
factory
lacked
essential
equipments
to
protect
workers from being affected by hazardous chemicals.
For
example,
before
ventilation
system
was
installed
in
late
1990s,
workers
handling
glues
and
solvents
had
to
routinely
work
in
dangerous
conditions,
inhaling
the
toxic
fumes
of
chemicals
throughout
their
shift.
Frequently,
workers
had
skin
irritations,
chronic
nausea,
respiratory
problems,
and
other
symptoms related to hazardous chemicals. Protective
equipments
such
as
gloves
or
masks,
if
delivered,
provided
inadequate
protections
because
wearing
gloves or masks could result in breathing difficulty in
hot
summers.
Meanwhile,
workers
were
not
pro-
vided
appropriate
safety
training
and
in
many
areas,
the
factory
lacked
safety
equipment
necessary
to
prevent
serious
injuries.
Reported
by
workers,
serious
accidents
occurred
and
workers’
arms,
hands
or
fingers
got
hurt.
Arbitrary punishments and abuses imposed by management
FS
management
enjoyed
uncircumscribed
power
to
discipline
and
punish
workers
very
arbitrarily.
Workers
who
worked
slow,
made
mistakes
or
offended
management
personally
most
often
were
scolded
in
harsh
words,
punished
by
wage
deduc-
tions,
or
even
dismissed
by
management.
Difficulties
in
taking
leave
or
resigning
China Labor Law stipulates employee being disabled
from
working
because
of
pregnancy,
childbirth,
or
related
medical
conditions
should
be
granted,
upon
request,
a
leave
of
absence.
But
at
shop
floor
of
FS,
especially
during
peak
production
seasons,
workers
had difficulties in getting management permission to
take
leaves.
More
seriously,
workers
were
denied
freedom
of
resignation
and
those
resigned
the
job
without
management
approval
would
not
get
their
monthly
payment
and
lost
the
chance
to
be
em-
ployed
by
the
company
again.
However,
rampant
labor
rights
violations
at
FS
not
only
resulted from
the coercive
labor
disciplines
imposed by management at workplace level, but also
had
close
relationship
with
macro
labor
regime
under
China’s
market
reform,
which
has
provided
insufficient
state
protection
of
labor
rights and
weak
union representation functions for Chinese workers.
Insufficient
state
protection
and
weak
union
representation
The
China
Labor
Law
of
1994,
is
the
first
com-
prehensive
labor
law
in
China’s
history,
providing
a
foundation to
stipulate a
wide range
of employment
relations
issues,
ranging
from
working
hours,
rests
and
leaves,
labor
safety
and
sanitation,
rights
of
fe-
male workers and juvenile workers to labor disputes
resolution.
On
article,
China
Labor
Law
is
compa-
rable
to
those
in
developed
countries
and
more
progressive
than
those
of
many
developing
coun-
tries.
However,
when
the
supervision
of
law
implementation
became
increasingly
decentralized,
developmentalist
local
governments
driven
by
the
impetus
for
attracting
foreign
investments
and
pro-
moting
local
economy
growth
have
neither
the
willingness nor the capacity to implement protective
labor
law.
Consequently,
enforcement
of
labor
law
lags
far
behind
its
legislation,
failing
to
guarantee
decent
working
conditions
for
Chinese
workers.
The
All-China
Federation
of
Trade
Unions
(ACFTU)
is
only
government-sanctioned
union
organization
in
China
and
independent
unions
or
other
types
of
worker
organizations
are
illegal.
However,
as
Chinese
party-state’s
apparatus
with
restricted autonomy, the ACFTU tends to prioritize
the
state’s
goals
over
its
function
in
representing
workers’
right
and
interests
(Timothy,
2002;
Chen,
2004).
Besides
being
controlled
by
the
party-state,
the
representational
function
of
enterprise-level
trade
unions
affiliated
with
the
ACFTU
is
further
hampered
by
managerial
control,
for
union
leader-
ship
is
often
dominated
by
management,
or
the
election
of
union
officials
is
manipulated
by
man-
agement
(Ding
et
al.,
2002;
Gallagher,
2004:28).
At
the
requirement
of
local
branch
of
the
AC-
FTU
in
Fuzhou
city,
FS
set
up
a
trade
union
for
its
employees
in
1997.
However,
all
union
committee
members were middle and high rank managerial staff
of the firm. Not joining in the union voluntarily, all
employees
were
recruited
into
the
trade
union
by
the
management
and
many
employees
were
even
unaware
of
the
union’s
existence
although
they
had
to
pay
union
membership
fee
every
month.
In
eyes
of
majority
of
production
workers,
FS
trade
union
518
Xiaomin
Yu
was
more
like
a
management
organ
than
an
employees’
organization
representing
workers
interests. Although the trade union had a ‘‘compliant
box,’’
few
employees
used
it
to
air
their
complaints
to the union, with fear of retaliation of management.
In
sum,
workers
of
FS
benefited
little
from
state
protection of labor rights because of the rift between
legislation
and
enforcement
of
China’s
labor
law.
Also,
lacking
representational
trade
union
at
shop
floor,
FS workers
had no
institutional
channel to
air
their
grievances
or
resist
exploitative
employment
practices.
Consequently,
managerial
power
was
arbitrary,
labor
disciplines
were
coercive,
and
vio-
lations of workers legal rights and human rights were
rampant.
Implementation
of
Reebok
labor-related
codes,
cost
sharing
and
conflicts
with
purchasing
practices
As
Reebok’s
second
largest
footwear
supplier
in
China,
FS
was
required
to
strictly
abide
by
Reebok
labor-related codes of conducts, or ‘‘Reebok Human
Rights Production Standards’’ in 1997 when Reebok
hired
a
part-time
local
staff
to
monitor
codes
implementation
at
FS.
Reebok
human
rights
staff
required FS management to: (1) make improvement
on
the
most
intensively
criticized
sweatshop-like
working conditions, such as using child labor, forcing
workers to take excessively long overtime, providing
dangerous
and
unhealthy
working
conditions,
and
having
corporal
punishments
and
other
managerial
harassments;
(2)
shorten
weekly
working
hours
to
60
h
(in
2004,
Reebok
further
constrained
the
maximum workweek to 49
h); (3) pay fair wages and
benefits
as
required
by
Chinese
law
(e.g.
overtime
wages,
legally
mandated
social
security,
bonuses,
salaried holidays and leaves); (4) take part in Reebok
‘‘worker
representation
initiatives’’
by
installing
an
employee-elected
trade union.
Considering
the
negative
effect
of
increased
pro-
duction
cost
on
its
profit
margin
resulting
from
Reebok
codes
implementation,
FS
management
took
a
relatively
cooperative
stance
in
seeking
res-
olution to labor problems which added less cost. For
instance,
the
company
provided
emergency
exits
or
fire
extinguishers
in
workplaces,
regularly
delivered
personal
protective
equipments
to
production
work-
ers
working
at
hazardous
and
unhealthy
positions,
switched
to
use
less
toxic
water-based
glues
on
pro-
duction
lines,
added
a
non-harassment
policy
into
its
Employee
Handbook,
and
hired
employees
older
than 18
years of age. However, FS management was
obviously
unwilling
to
make
real
improvement
on
labor
standards
causing
significant
increase
of
labor
cost,
especially
paying
overtime
wages
and
offering
bonuses
and
benefits
required
by
Chinese
law.
In
order
to
justify
its
reluctance
to
implement
cost-
raising
labor
standards,
FS
highlighted
the
fact
that
Reebok’s
current
purchasing
practices
had
con-
strained its incentives and capability to achieve a full
compliance
of
Reebok
codes.
Purchasing
practices
of
branded
merchandisers
such
as
Nike,
Adidas,
and
Reebok
who
dominate
global athletic footwear industry are based on annual
supplier
evaluation
using
criteria
on
price,
quality,
timeliness
of
delivery,
and
in
recent
years,
labor
practices.
Similarly,
Reebok
uses
such
multi-
dimensional criteria to evaluate its suppliers annually
and
awards
a
score
to
each
supplier.
Normally,
suppliers
with
highest
score
which
are
called
‘‘best
partner’’
will
receive
a
relatively
higher
(for
the
most,
20%
higher)
volume
of
forward
orders.
17
However,
given
price,
quality,
and
time
to
market
have
direct
impact
on
branded
merchandisers’
competitiveness
at
marketplace,
these
criteria
are
often
prioritized
over
labor
standards
when
branded
merchandisers
evaluate
suppliers.
Although
Reebok
positions
itself
as
an
industrial
leader in CSR field, the company is unwilling to play
a
leading
role
in
reforming
its
purchasing
policy
or
sharing
cost
for
improving
labor
standards
with
suppliers.
Firstly,
although
Reebok
distinguishes
itself
from
other
branded
merchandisers
by
address-
ing the discrepancy between purchasing practices and
labor-related
codes
18
,
the
company
fails
to
provide
any
substantial
solution
to
this
problem.
Instead,
using its purchasing power, Reebok relies heavily on
punishment-oriented method to force its suppliers to
comply
with
Reebok
labor-related
codes,
without
amending
its
sourcing
policy
to
provide
more
incentives and rewards to suppliers with better labor
practices.
For
example,
Reebok
even
introduces
a
‘‘Sanctions
Matrix’’
which
creates
a
sliding
scale
of
violation
levels
and
financially
penalizes
the
factory
for
noncompliance
of
its
codes.
Secondly,
when
competitions
at
marketplace
became
fiercer
and
fiercer
during
the
past
decade,
just
like
all
other
top
Impact
of
Corporate
Code
of
Conduct
on
Labor
Standards
519
branded
merchandisers
in
this
industry,
Reebok
prefers to using its buying power to force suppliers to
comply
with
its
labor-related
codes
rather
than
offering higher unit price to sharing financial costs for
improving
labor
standards
with
its
suppliers.
The
escalating
competitions
at
retail
market
are
clearly
mirrored by the shrinking retail prices. For instance,
the
average
price
per
pair
of
athletic
shoes
dropped
from
$42.5
in
1997
to
$33.18
in
2004,
shrinking
nearly
22
present over
1997–2004.
19
FS
management’s
response
to
the
dilemma
between
labor
standards
and
profitability
Although
FS
was
evaluated
as
‘‘best
partner’’
of
Reebok,
the
company
had
no
bargaining
power
to
made Reebok agree to share the costs for improving
labor
standards.
Instead,
the
company
experienced
continuous
price-cutting
imposed
by
Reebok
when
retailing price kept dropping during the past decade.
Consequently,
FS
management
was
caught
in
a
di-
lemma:
how
to
implement
Reebok
labor-related
codes
and
simultaneously
maintain
its
own
profit-
ability
in
a
brutal
market
context.
From FS management’s perspective, the only way
to
solve
the
dilemma
was
to
improve
internal
management,
lower
production
cost,
and
boost
productive
efficiency.
Consequently,
in
2002,
with
support
of
Reebok,
FS
management
began
to
reorganize the production process at shop floor of FS
around ‘‘New Production System’’ (NPS) principles,
a
production
philosophy
developed
by
Taiwanese
engineers
basing
on
essences
of
‘‘Lean
Production
System’’
(LPS),
the
popular
post-Fordist
production
system
pioneered
by
Japanese
automobile
firm,
Toyota.
The
NPS
reform
taking
place
at
FS
bore
resemblance
to
key
principles
of
LPS,
especially
principles
on
elimination
of
non-value-added
activities
and
just-in-time
production
and
delivery.
However,
NPS
reform
at
FS
was
not
a
full-version
utilization
of
LPS
principles,
but
a
hybridization
of
Taylorism
and
LPS
which
incorporated
Taylorist
labor
control
methods
and
LPS
innovations
on
production
management.
FS
management
turned
to
be quite skeptical over the contribution of employee
‘‘empowerment,’’
‘‘involvement,’’
or
‘‘participa-
tion’’
programs
to
productive
efficiency
and
con-
tinued to rely on Taylorist managerial hierarchies for
direct
labor
control
and
productivity.
As
a
result,
NPS
reform
at
FS
did
not
include
any
forms
of
employee
involvement,
participation
or
empower-
ment schemes, leaving production workers voiceless
and
powerless
in
labor
process.
In
order
to
make
FS
management
satisfied,
NPS
reform resulted in a significantincrease of productivity
and reduction of production time. As one Taiwanese
manager described, ‘‘
using 30% more workers, NPS lines
could make the daily production volume increase 50%, or a
15%
increase
of
productivity
.’’
20
In
order
to
reward FS
for
the
boosted
productive
efficiency
and
flexibility,
Reebok
increased
its
order
volume
placed
at
FS
by
15%
in
2004,
making
FS’s
monthly
order
volume
increase to about 1.5
million pairs of shoes. However,
NPS reform at FS provided negative consequences for
production
workers
who
had
to
work
in
a
more
stressful environment to complete higher production
tasks
when
the
workweek
was
shortened
from
over
60
h in 2002 to about 50
h in 2004. Firstly, reflecting
LPS
principle
on
‘‘elimination
of
non-value-added
activities,’’
NPS
reform
at
FS
centered
on
cost
reduction activities which frequently were applied to
labor and sharply reduced buffers between operations,
eliminated slack time during work. Secondly, to boost
production
volume,
workers
were
assigned
higher
production
tasks
and
work-pace
was
speeded-up,
making
work
at
NPS
lines
more
laborious
and
stressful.
Thirdly,
to
make
sure
the
increased
pro-
duction
volume
not
be
flattened
by
increased
labor
cost,
NPS
lines
were
made
deliberately
understaffed
and most often experienced workers were required to
take multi-tasks.
The question is, therefore, has implementation of
Reebok
human
rights
standards
under
NPS
reform
resulted
in
real
improvement
of
workplace
labor
standards?
Viewing
the
issues
of
workers’
wages
as
one of the most controversial labor standards-related
problems
in
athletic
footwear
industry,
in
the
fol-
lowing section, I will examine the combined impacts
of
Reebok
labor-related
codes
and
NPS
reform
on
FS
workers’
wages.
Combined
impacts
of
Reebok’s
‘‘legal
minimalist’’
wages
policy
and
NPS
reform
on
workers’
wages
Just
like
all
other
branded
merchandisers,
Reebok
merely
required
its
suppliers
to
pay
legal
minimum
520
Xiaomin
Yu
wage
or
the
prevailing
industry
wage
(whichever
is
higher),
rather
than
a
‘‘living
wage’’
required
by
labor
right
advocacy
groups
to
ensure
workers’
full-
time
wages
are
adequate
to
meet
the
basic
needs
(food,
shelter,
clothing,
transport,
basic
education,
and
basic
health
care)
of
a
small
family.
21
In
prac-
tices,
when
Reebok
human
rights
staff
monitored
the
implementation
of
its
wage
standard,
they
fol-
lowed
a
‘‘legal
minimalist’’
approach.
As
Reebok
human rights manager in China described, ‘‘
On issue
of wages, for us [Reebok], the most important principle was
to
ensure
all
footwear
factories
to
pay
wages
abiding
by
Chinese
law
and
regulation.
That’s
mean
workers
should
at least be paid: a basic wage equal to legal minimum wage
for
regular
workweek;
and
overtime
wages
which
were
properly
paid
at
compensation
rates
stipulated
by
China
Labor
Law
.’’
22
Before
Reebok
fully
implemented
its
‘‘legal
minimalist’’
wage
policy
at
FS
in
2002,
the
com-
pany’s
wage
system
was
solely
under
control
of
the
management.
In
1993,
China
Ministry
of
Labor
issued
Enterprise
Minimum
Wage
Regulation
which
was
amended
in
2004,
empowering
local
labor
administrative
departments
at
province,
autonomous
region
and
municipality
levels
to
for-
mulate
the
minimum
wages
for
enterprises
under
their
jurisdiction.
Nevertheless,
in
many
regions,
as
local
authorities
try
to
maintain
the
image
of
an
investor’s
paradise
for
low
production
costs,
mini-
mum wages are frequently frozen below the level of
local
economic
development
and
the
increase
of
enterprises
profitability.
23
For
instance,
the
mini-
mum
wage
of
Fuzhou
city
in
1994
was
set
at
225
RMB yuan (or 29
US$) and increased slowly during
the
past
decade,
reaching
470
RMB
yuan
(or
60
US$)
in
2005
24
,
still
being
too
low
to
meet
workers’
basic
needs,
let
alone
supporting
their
family
members.
Although
the
legal
minimum
wages
in
Fuzhou
city
were
continuously
frozen
at
below-subsistence
level,
the
minimum
wage
regulation
did
not
have
any
impact
on
FS
wage
system
during1989
to
2002
when
monthly
payment
of
best
majority
of
pro-
duction
workers
was
largely
piece-rate-based.
In
order to boost workers’ loyalty, the wage system also
included
bonuses
for
full-attendance,
long-service,
skill
and
year-of-end
allowance,
however,
piece–
rate-wages remained the major part of workers’ total
monthly
wages
(taking
up
80–90%).
Only
manage-
rial
and
salaried
non-production
staff,
but
not
pro-
duction
workers,
were
paid
a
base
wage
and
overtime
wage
by
legally
mandated
compensation
rates.
By
2002,
when
Reebok
began
to
seek
a
fully
implementation
of
its
‘‘legal
minimalist’’
wages
policy at FS, the company was forced to ‘‘amended’’
the
wage
structure
of
FS
production
workers
to
include
two
items:
(1)
base
wage
equal
to
Fuzhou
legal
minimum
wage;
(2)
overtime
wages
properly
paid at compensation rates stipulated by China Labor
Law.
However,
the
wage
structure
of
production
workers
was
amended
merely
‘‘formalistically’’.
Although
the
new
payroll
showed
that
production
workers began to earn both base wages and properly
paid
overtime
wages,
substantially,
FS
production
workers’
payment
was
continuously
determined
by
the
preceding
piece-rate-based
wage
system.
Employing
such
a
double-track
wage
system
–
one
was
covertly
used
preceding
piece-rate-based
wage
system,
the
other
was
the
overtly
used
one
‘‘form-
alistically’’
providing
base
wage
and
overtime
time
wage
for
production
workers
–
FS
management
found the cheapest solution to the dilemma between
implementing
Reebok
wage
standards
and
increas-
ing
labor
cost.
On
the
one
hand,
FS
management
could
use
the
new
payroll
system
which
markedly
recorded
the
sufficiently
paid
base
wages
and
over-
time
wages
to
convince
monitors
sent
by
Reebok
that
the
company
had
perfectively
implemented
Reebok
‘‘legal
minimalist’’
wages
policy;
on
the
other hand, because production workers’ base wages
and
overtime
time
wages
were
merely
parts
of
‘‘renamed’’
piece-rate
wages,
not
adding
any
addi-
tional
labor
cost
for
the
company.
In
order
to
pre-
vent
production
workers
from
using
the
double-
track
wage
system
as
tool
for
claiming
actual
pay-
ment
of
base
and
overtime
wage,
the
company
maintained
piece-rate
wage
system
only
covertly,
allowing
production
workers
no
information
access
to their daily output and pay rate of their piecework.
Moreover,
during
NPS
production
process
reform,
FS
management
took
various
efforts
to
tighten
control
over
labor
cost.
Firstly,
when
labor
productivity
enhanced
and
overtime-working
hours
shortened
under
NPS
production
system,
FS
man-
agement
took
the
chance
to
reduce
workers’
wage,
telling
workers
that
it
was
‘‘reasonable’’
for
worker
to
receive
less
payment
for
shortened
overtime-
Impact
of
Corporate
Code
of
Conduct
on
Labor
Standards
521
working
hours.
In
order
to
make
it
workable,
FS
management
employed
more
punitive
labor
disci-
plinary methods to ensure hourly labor productivity.
Secondly,
although
NPS
system
enhanced
labor
productivity
by
forcing
production
workers
to
take
multi-tasks,
or
speeding-up
work
pace,
FS
man-
agement
deceitfully
put
a
ceiling
on
workers’
wages
by
reducing
pay-rate
of
piecework
or
falsely
recording
workers’
output
once
productivity
boos-
ted
significantly.
As
one
worker
in
stock-fitting
department recalled, ‘‘
Once the production line switched
to
new
shoe
model,
staff
of
Industrial
Engineering
(IE)
department will come to measure the hourly productivity of
various work positions in the production line and set piece-
rate
of
each
position.
However,
if
workers
productivity
increased
significantly
in
short
period,
the
company
would
send
IE
staff
back
to
recheck
if
piece-rate
was
low
enough.
For
instance,
during
Match
to
April
of
2003
when
we
worked
on
shoe
model
#
2410,
at
the
beginning,
the
average piece rate was set at 0.12 RMB yuan per pair and
workers’
wages
were
relatively
higher
because
of
quickly
increased productivity, but in the second month, the average
piece
rate
was
reduced
to
0.09
RMB
yuan
and
workers
wages
declined
accordingly
.’’
Meanwhile,
line
supervi-
sors
were
disciplined
to
record
workers’
production
output
falsely
to
make
sure
workers’
piece-rate
wa-
ges
did
not
exceed
the
ceiling.
As
one
stitching
worker
complained,
‘‘
After
NPS
reform,
I
was
trained
as
multi-skilled
workers
and
required
to
take
two
work
assignments. My line supervisor told me I would be paid by
production
output,
so
my
piece-rate
wage
could
reach
1000
RMB
yuan.
But
finally,
I
found
my
piece-rate
wage
was
merely
700
RMB
yuan.
Later,
the
line
supervisor told me that it was not her fault because she had
recorded
and
reported
accurately
my
output,
but
the
com-
pany
had
set
the
maximum
wages
of
stitching
workers
as
800
RMB
yuan. If
workers’
piece-rate
wage exceeded
the
maximum,
line
supervisors
will
be
strictly
scolded
by
manager,
so
none
line
supervisor
would
report
the
correct
output which could make workers’ wage exceed 800
RMB
yuan
.’’
Thirdly,
NPS
reform
had
switched
produc-
tion
cost
for
quality-related
problems
to
shop
floor
or
even
individual
production
workers.
Consequently,
to
make
FS
production
workers
disappointed,
the
implementation
of
Reebok’s
‘‘legal
minimalist’’
wages
policy
at
FS
merely
amended
the
wage
structure
formalistically,
but
delivered
no
real
economic
benefits
to
production
workers.
Quite
the
contrary,
combined
with
the
negative
effect
of
NPS
reform,
the
implementation
of
Reebok’s
‘‘legal
minimalist’’
wages
policy
had
resulted in a significant drop of production workers’
wages. During the pre-reform years (1997–2001), as
showed
by
Figure
1,
the
average
wages
of
produc-
tion workers in all departments was about 850
RMB
yuan
(or
109
US$),
while
during
the
post-reform
years
(2002–2004)
the
figure
declined
to
725
RMB
yuan (or 93
US$). Could the average monthly wages
of
FS
production
workers
reach
the
level
of
local
legal
minimum
wage,
prevailing
industry
wage
or
a
‘‘living
wage’’
standard?
As
illustrated
by
Figure
1,
the
implementation
Reebok’s
‘‘legal
minimalist’’
wages
policy
and
NPS
reform
in
2002
had
reduced
average
wages
of
FS
production
workers
to
a
level
850
850
850
850
850
725
725
725
395
471
520
583
652
734
825
933
245
280
300
350
380
380
400
400
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
700
800
900
1000
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
Year
(RMB Yuan)
Average monthly Wages of FS Production Workers
Prevailing Monthly Wages of Footwear Industry of China
Legal Minimum Wages of Fuzhou City
Figure
1.
Comparison
of
average
monthly
wages
of
FS
production
workers
with
prevailing
monthly
wages
of
footwear
industry
of
China*
and
legal
minimum
wages
of
Fuzhou
city,
1997–2004.
*
Data
on
Prevailing
Monthly
Wages
of
Footwear
Industries
of
China
1997-
2004
were
composed
basing
on
Prevailing
Monthly
Wages
of
Manufacturing
Industries
of
China
1997–2004
and
average
wage
ratio
of
footwear
industry/manu-
facturing
industries
of
China
2003–2004
(0.8).
Source
:
Zhongguo
Laodong
Tongji
Nianjian
(China
Labor
Sta-
tistics
Yearbook)
2003–2005;
Fujian
Ribao
(Fujian
Dai-
ly)
July
6,
2005;
Fuzhou
Wanbao
(Fuzhou
Evening
News)
October
23,
2003;
Fujian
Ribao
(Fujian
Daily)
July
7,
2001;
Zhongguo
Laodong
he
Shehui
Baozhang
Nianjian
(China
Labor
and
Social
Security
Yearbook)
2000;
Jingji
Cankao
Bao
(Economy
Reference
News)
July
26,
1995;
interviews
with
FS
production
workers
2002–2005.
522
Xiaomin
Yu
lower
than
prevailing
wage
of
footwear
industry
in
China,
although
the
figures
remain
higher
than
Fuzhou legal minimum wages. Firstly, during 1997–
2004,
the
average
monthly
wages
of
FS
production
workers
were
above
Fuzhou
legal
minimum
wages
which were set too low to meet workers’ basic needs
for
food,
clothing,
housing,
and
medical
care.
Sec-
ondly,
the
average
monthly
wages
of
FS
production
workers
were
above
the
prevailing
wages
of
foot-
wear industry in China during 1997–2001, however,
during
2002–2004
when
majority
of
footwear
pro-
duction
workers
of
China
began
to
enjoy
increased
wages FS workers found their wages were shrinking
dramatically.
Thirdly,
many
production
workers
complained
that
declined
wages
could
hardly
meet
their
basic
living
costs.
Worse,
reduced
wages
made
lives of workers who had family member depending
on
them
for
livelihoods
even
harder.
As
one
working
mother
complained,
‘‘
I
have
two
kids
living
with
me
here,
one
is
12,
and
the
other
is
8.
My
husband
also
works
in
this
company.
In
previous
years
when
we
earned
800–900
RMB
yuan
per
month,
the
payment
could
meet
the
basic
needs
of
my
family.
But
now,
being
paid
merely
600–700
RMB
yuan
per
month,
we
can
hardly
made
ends
meet.
’’
In
sum,
the
implementation
of
Reebok
labor-
related
codes
at
FS
during
1997–2005
had
imposed
contradictory
impacts
on
labor
standards.
When
many
intensively criticized sweatshop labor abuses
–
for
example, using child labor, providing unsafe
and
unhealthy
working
conditions,
forcing
workers
to
take
long
overtime
–
were
curbed,
vast
majority
of
FS
production
workers
found
disappointedly
that
they
were
required
to
work
harder,
faster
but
were
rewarded
with
meaner
payment
under
NPS
pro-
duction system used by FS management as a solution
to
the
dilemma
between
implementing
Reebok
labor-related
codes
and
maintaining
profitability.
One
of
the
most
important
causes
for
the
limited
improvement
of
labor
standards
at
shop
floor
of
FS
lied
in
that
Reebok
had
committed
to
neither
sharing
cost
for
code
implementation
with
FS
nor
amending
its
sourcing
policy
to
make
improvement
labor
standards
more
financially
manageable
to
FS
management, although Reebok enjoyed a significant
growth
in
profitability
during
the
past
few
years.
Worse,
to
further
enhance
its
competitiveness
and
profitability,
Reebok
lowered
the
average
piece
price
of
orders
placed
with
FS
by
10%
in
2005.
Representational
functions
of
the
employee-elected
trade
union
resulted
from
codes
implementation
Unlike
other
branded
merchandisers
in
sportswear
industry,
Reebok
aggressively
addresses
worker’s
right
to
freedom
of
association,
launching
‘‘worker
representation
initiatives’’
in
Indonesia,
Thailand
and
China
where
independent
trade
unions
are
restricted
by
law.
As
part
of
its
‘‘worker
represen-
tation
initiatives,’’
in
2001,
Reebok
facilitated
a
se-
cret ballot election of trade union affiliated with local
branch
of
the
ACFTU
in
one
of
its
footwear
supplying
factories
in
Shenzhen
city,
South
China.
In
2002,
similarly
promoted
by
Reebok,
an
em-
ployee-elected
trade
union
headed
by
chairman
and
vice-chairman elected from production workers was
installed
in
FS.
Noticeably,
compared
with
the
preceding
man-
agement-dominant
FS
trade
union
which
had
no
awareness
and
support
of
production
workers,
the
new
trade
union
elected
through
democratic
pro-
cedure represented a significant step toward worker’s
rights to freedom of association. It was the first time
that
production
workers
at
FS
were
given
voting
power
to
select
union
representatives
from
candi-
dates
created
through
self-nomination
procedure
rather
than
assignments
of
the
management
or
Chinese
official
trade
union,
the
ACFTU.
However,
what
is
at
stake
is
how
far
will
the
employee-elected
trade
union
be
able
to
go
to
represent
employees’
interests
under
China’
labor
regime
where
independent
trade
unions
are
repressed
ruthlessly
and
strikes
or
other
radical
industrial actions
are restricted strictly.
Both China’s
national
law
and
local
regulation
of
Fujian
prov-
ince
25
assign
union
organizations
affiliated
with
the
ACFTU
in
Foreign-funded-enterprises
(FFEs)
tri-
ple-representing
roles:
(1)
protecting
employees’
legal rights and interests, (2) supporting state’s reform
and
opening
policy
and
representing
the
overall
interests
of
the
entire
people,
(3)
respecting
inves-
tor’s interest and promoting enterprise development.
Such triple-representing roles are created by Chinese
party-state
and
the
ACFTU,
premising
the
interests
of employees, state and employers are harmonious in
principle. However, in reality, interests of employee
and
employer
are
fundamentally
conflictive
and
labor-management
relations
at
FFEs
are
most
often
antagonistic.
Impact
of
Corporate
Code
of
Conduct
on
Labor
Standards
523
In
line
with
China’s
national
and
local
law
and
regulations on trade union, FS Trade Union Charter
assigned
triple-representing
roles
to
the
elected
union.
The
Charter
proclaimed
roles
of
the
FS
union as: (1) representing and protecting employees’
legal
rights
and
interests;
(2)
facilitating
labor-man-
agement
communication;
(3)
mediating
and
resolving
labor
disputes;
(4)
strengthening
the
implementation
of
company
rules
and
[Reebok]
human right standards; (5) carrying out tasks assigned
by
higher-level
branches
of
the
ACFTU.
FS
Trade
Union Charter did allow the union to sign collective
contracts with enterprise on behalf of employees, but
had
no
provision
on
union’s
rights
to
collective
bargaining.
Unlike
trade
unions
in
most
Western
countries
which
are
entitled
to
engage
in
overt
confrontational
collective
bargaining
activities
(e.g.,
strikes,
work
slowdowns),
China’s
trade
unions
are
banned to employ such an adversative representation
strategy.
Accordingly,
FS
Trade
Union
Charter
included
merely
narrow
empowering
provisions,
merely
enabling
the
union
to
take
part
in
non-
confrontational
collective
consultation
activities.
As
documented
by
many
studies,
China’s
enter-
prises
trade
unions’
roles
in
representing
employees’
rights and interests are restrained by the fact that they
lack structural and operational autonomy in carrying
out
union
activities
(Chen,
2004;
Gallagher,
2004;
Zhu
and
Warner,
2005).
Analyzing
the
power
structure of FS trade union, I find the union operates
in
a
power
relationship
of
triple
dependence:
(1)
on
local branch of the ACFTU, (2) on FS management,
and
(3)
on
Reebok
human
right
staff.
Firstly,
using
their
leadership
status,
local
branch
of
the
ACFTU
repeatedly coached FS union committee members to
carry
out
union
activities
in
a
cooperative
union-
company
relationship,
avoiding
using
any
confron-
tational
strategy.
Secondly,
FS
management
used
various techniques to co-opt the elected union into a
managerial
tool,
representing
more
interests
of
the
company
than
that
of
employees,
ranging
from
controlling
union
funds,
buying-off
union
cadres
with
wage
increase
and
chance
for
promotion,
to
intimidating
and
punishing
union
committee
members daring to address workers’ most concerned
problems
and
seek
radical
reform
of
arbitrary
man-
agement.
Thirdly,
although
Reebok
intervened
in
with
a
union-supportive
stance
in
early
stage
of
union
operation,
to
safeguard
its
long-term
good
relationship with FS, Reebok refused to provide any
institutional
protection
for
union
committee
mem-
bers
from
management
anti-union
harassment
and
discrimination.
Analyzing
main
activities
carried
out
by
FS
employee-elected
trade
union
during
2002–2005,
I
find,
not
being
empowered
to
deal
with
workers
concerned-most
issues
–
such
as
limiting
managerial
authoritarianism
by
impartial
disputes
arbitration
system,
creating
a
transparent
and
fair
wage
system
and seeking wages increase when the company make
increased profits – the union functioned more like a
‘‘company
union’’
which
is
usually
initiated
and
dominated
by
employer,
serving
the
interests
of
FS
management
for
boosting
employee
loyalty,
morale
and
productive
efficiency,
and
a
grievance
channel
releasing
Reebok
from
expensive
monitoring
of
its
labor-related
codes
implementation.
Although
FS
trade
union
was
allowed
to
make
recommendation
on
trivial
welfare
issues,
FS
management
remained
the
single
governor
of
all
matters
concerning
workers’
rewards
and
discipline,
and
management
arbitrariness
still
prevailingly
uncircumscribed.
As
discussed
above,
the
limited
achievement
of
the
union
not
only
had
roots
in
China’s
contemporary
labor
regime,
but
also
had
closely
relations
with
the
negotiated agency of Reebok, local ACFTU, and FS
management
over
the
roles
and
power
of
FS
trade
union.
Conclusions
and
research
implications
This
article
examines
the
social
results
of
labor-re-
lated
CSR
policy
or
corporate
codes
of
conduct
in
improving
labor
standards
through
a
long-term
case
study
of
implementation
of
Reebok
labor-related
codes
at
one
of
its
major
footwear
supplier
factory
located in Fuzhou city, south China. I find, as a kind
of
private
regulation
tools
for
establishing
minimum
labor
standards
across
national
boundaries,
Reebok
labor-related
codes
has
resulted
in
‘‘race
to
ethical
and legal minimum’’ labor standards at workplace of
FS.
First,
inhumane
labor
practices
making
main-
stream
consumers
in
the
developed
world
morally
outrage
were
curbed,
which
frequently
are
working
conditions-related
issues
(for instance,
using of
child
labor,
forcing
workers
to
labor
in
unsafe
and
unhealthy working conditions, or imposing corporal
524
Xiaomin
Yu
punishments
to
discipline
workers.
Second,
labor
practices
seriously
violating
China
Labor
Law,
for
example,
forcing
workers
to
take
overtime
working
hours longer
than legal maximum workweek or
not
paying
legal
minimum
wage
also
were
regulated.
Such a ‘‘race to ethical and legal minimum’’ effect
protected
Reebok
from
being
attacked
by
anti-
sweatshop activism and even contributed to Reebok
long-term
profitability
but
rarely
met
Chinese
workers’
expectations
of
labor
practices
improve-
ment.
Quite
the
contrary,
in
exchange
for
the
minimum
labor
standards
on
which
they
had
nearly
no
voice
and
agency,
Chinese
workers
of
FS
were
forced by authoritarian management to work harder,
faster
but
earn
less
payment
which
was
no
longer
sufficient
to
meet basic
needs
of
workers
themselves
and their family dependants. Although an employee-
elected
trade
union
was
installed
in
FS
at
require-
ment
of
Reebok
to
trumpet
its
commitment
to
workers’
rights
to
freedom
and
association,
the
union
worked
more
like
a
‘‘company
union’’
rather
than
an
autonomous
worker
organization
repre-
senting
worker’
interests.
The
union
brought
feeble
hope
for
workplace
democratization
and
failed
to
enhance
workers’
bargaining
power
in
demanding
for
better
working
conditions
and
payment.
The
restricted
effectiveness
of
Reebok
labor-re-
lated
codes
in
improving
labor
standards
at
work-
place of FS, especially on issues of providing a living
wage
and
promoting
workers’
rights
to
freedom
of
association and collective bargaining was determined
by
both
inhibiting
structural
forces
and
agency-re-
lated
factors
embedded
in
industrial,
national
and
local
contexts.
At
industrial
level,
CSR
movement
in
athletic
footwear
industry
centering
on
creation
and
imple-
mentation
of
codes
of
conduct
is
dominated
by
branded
merchandisers
like
Reebok
driven
by
commercial
incentives
for
long-term
profitability.
The
commercialization
agenda
of
CSR
movement
put
a
ceiling
on
effectiveness
of
codes
of
conduct
in
improving
labor
standards,
especially
on
issues
of
wages
and
workers’
rights
to
freedom
of
association
and
collective
bargaining,
which
could
jeopardize
corporation’s
pursuit
of
profit
maximization.
Per-
sistently relying on a sourcing policy prioritizing low
price,
high
quality,
and
just-in-time
delivery
over
labor
practices
for
sales
and
profits,
Reebok
‘‘out-
sourced’’
its
labor-related
CSR
policy
to
FS,
using
its
buying
power
to
pressure
FS
to
absorb
added
financial
cost
for
improving
labor
standards,
rather
than committing to share costs or amend its sourcing
policy
to
make
improving
labor
standards
more
financially
manageable
to
FS
management.
Facing
the dilemma between improving labor standards and
maintaining profitability, FS management pass down
the
cost
for
implementing
Reebok
labor-related
codes to production workers, forcing workers to pay
for
the
‘‘race
to
moral
and
legal
minimum’’
labor
standards
at
costs
of
harder
work
and
less
payment.
The
continuously
declining
average
prices
at
key
athletic footwear markets also illustrated the negative
effects
of
consumption
pattern
and
competition
trends
at
marketplace
on
improvement
of
labor
standards.
At
national
and
local
levels,
China’s
labor
regime
at
both
central
and
local
level
provided
no
enforceable
legislations
and
effective
institutions
to
protect Chinese workers rights, resulting in rampant
sweatshop
labor
abuses
especially
in
labor-intensive
manufacturing
industries.
Similarly,
China’s
labor
regime
prioritizing
economic
development
over
la-
bor protection constrained the promises of corporate
codes in upholding labor standards. In my case study
on
impacts
of
Reebok’s
‘‘legal
minimalist’’
wages
policy
on
workers
wages,
the
below-subsistence
legal
minimum
wages
in
Fuzhou
city
provided
an
unfavorable
legislative
environment
preventing
FS
workers from gaining real benefits in wages/benefits
increases, but merely servicing Reebok’s impetus for
high-profile
CSR
reputation
and
helping
FS
man-
agement
to solve
dilemma between
profitability
and
codes
implementation.
Meanwhile,
China
has
not
signed
ILO
core
conventions on freedom of association and collective
bargaining
and
China’s
current
labor
regime
bans
independent
trade
unions
and
workers
rights
to
strikes or other confrontational collective bargaining
actions.
However,
as
the
only
government-sanc-
tioned
union
organization
in
China,
the
ACFTU
and
its
affiliations
at
local
and
enterprise
levels
lack
autonomy
in
relations
with
Chinese
party-state
and
employers
and
play
a
very
weak
representational
role.
Operating
in
such
a
context,
not
surprisingly,
labor-related
codes
had
little
chance
to
deliver
any
autonomous
worker
organization
with
collective
bargaining
power.
In
case
of
practices
of
Reebok
‘‘employee
representation
initiatives’’
in
FS,
abiding
Impact
of
Corporate
Code
of
Conduct
on
Labor
Standards
525
by China’s national law and local regulation on trade
union,
the
employee-elected
trade
union
was
assigned
a
non-confrontational
triple-representing-
role
and
operated
in
a
triple-dependence
power
relations
with
local
branches
of
the
ACFTU,
FS
management and Reebok. Consequently, the union
achieved
‘‘workplace
democratization’’
to
a
very
slight
extent,
having
merely
rights
to
make
recom-
mendation
on
trivial
welfare
issues
but
no
say
over
matters
concerning
labor
discipline
and
workers’
rewards
in
labor
process.
At
most,
the
union
has
functioned
as
a
managerial
tool
for
rationalizing
capitalist
employment
relations
under
ideology
of
‘‘welfare
capitalism’’,
playing
no
collective
bargain-
ing role in demanding for better working conditions
and
payment.
The
case
study
shows
codes
of
conduct
with
a
commercialized
CSR
agenda
have
serious
limita-
tions
in
improving
labor
standards,
although
codes
contributed
to
eliminate
the
most
egregious
sweat-
shop
abuses.
The
effectiveness
of
codes
may
be
constrained
by
unsolved
tension
between
corpora-
tions’
impetus
for
profit
maximization
and
com-
mitment
to
social
responsibility,
hard-nosed
competition realities
at marketplace, and
insufficient
state
protection
of
labor
rights.
Therefore,
the
daunting
question
for
CSR
researchers
and
practi-
tioners
becomes
how
about
the
way-outs
to
over-
come these fatally
inhibiting
effects in
order to keep
a fine balance between financial and social outcomes
of
labor-related
CSR
practice.
Below
I
suggest
two
possible
solutions.
Sharing
cost
for
improving
labor
standards
among
key
players
in
global
supply
chain
As
showed
by
this
case
study
and
many
other
empirical research of codes implementation,
26
one of
key
factor
prohibiting
the
effectiveness
of
codes
lies
in
that the costs for improving labor standards is
not
distributed
fairly
among
key
players
in
global
supply
chains.
In
athletic
footwear
industry,
branded
mer-
chandisers
such
as
Nike,
Adidas,
Reebok,
and
retailers
such
as
Foot
Locker,
The
Finish
Line,
and
Wal-Mart generally enjoy higher profit margins than
suppliers
such
as
Yue
Yuen.
For
instance,
the
aver-
age
profit
margin
of
Nike,
Foot
Locker
and
Yue
Yuen,
–
the
largest
firm
at
wholesale,
retail
and
production node of athletic footwear supply chain –
was
40%,
31%,
and
26%,
respectively
during
1996–
2004. However, branded merchandisers and retailers
have
made
no
commitments
to
sharing
costs
for
improving
labor
standards
with
suppliers,
especially
on
issues
of
providing
living
wages
for
production
workers.
Branded
merchandisers
repeatedly
call
paying
worker
a
‘‘living
wage’’
unrealistic,
highlighting
increasing
workers
wages
will
result
in
unintended
workers
layoffs.
Many
labor
right
advocacy
groups,
such
as
Community
Aid
Abroad-Oxfam
Australia,
The
National
Labor
Committee
and
China
Labor
Watch
conceive
that
branded
merchandisers
having
very
wide
profit
margins
and
enormous
profits
can
easily
absorb
the
increased
cost
for
paying
worker
living
wages
if
they
agree
to
contribute
a
small
part
of their profits or reduce expenditures on advertising
and promotion activities. My case study on wages of
production
workers
of
FS
shows
that
paying
16000
Chinese
workers
of
FS
a
living
wage
will
only
cost
an
extra
$3
million
a
year
which
accounts
for
less
than
2%
of
Reebok’
average
profits
or
advertising
and
promotion
expenses
during
2002–2004,
or
merely
4%
of
Chinese
basketball
super
star
Yao
Ming’s
endorsement
money
of
$70
million
paid
by
Reebok
in
2003.
Meanwhile,
at
the
top
of
commodity
chain
of
athletic
footwear,
big
retailers
also
rake
in
huge
profits.
In
pursuit
of
profit
maximization,
retailers
frequently
use
their
negotiating
strength
stemming
from access to consumers to bargain for lower-priced
and
just-in-time-delivered
products,
exerting
downward
pressure
for
labor
practices.
Especially,
discount
and
low-end
retailers
like
Wal-Mart,
Tar-
get,
and
Kmart
relying
heavily
on
their
low-price
edges for sales and profitability have more incentives
to
squeeze
production
cost
from
manufacturing
circle
and
have
direct
responsibility
for
labor
rights
abuses.
Oddly
enough,
however,
we
have
rarely
heard that retailers have come in under radar of anti-
sweatshop
activists
advocating
labor
rights
of
the
developing
world
nor
seen
retailers
catching
the
spotlight
on
labor-related
CSR
issues
of
the
devel-
oping
countries.
However,
these
retailers
reaping
enormous profits from outsourcing manufacturing in
low-wage
countries
do
have
responsibilities
for
improving
working
conditions
and
workers’
liveli-
hoods. If more retailing corporations had committed
526
Xiaomin
Yu
themselves
to
social
responsibility
toward
labor
practices,
labor-related
CSR
policies
would
have
been
more
successful
in
upholding
global
labor
standards.
Combining
regulatory
power
of
codes,
state
legislation
and
international
law
Even
though
codes
of
conduct
could
be
imple-
mented
more
effectively
if
the
implementation
cost
has
been
shared
fairly
among
key
players
in
global
supply
chain,
codes
remain
have
shortages
in
terms
of
protection
coverage.
Codes
of
conduct
primarily
influence
labor
practices
in
the
small
slice
of
global
economy,
currently,
providing protection merely
to
workers
in
export
processing
industries,
but
rarely
reach
workers
producing
for
domestic
consumption
in
developing
countries
lacking
ethically
inclined
consumers.
In
order
to
enlarge
the
possibilities
for
a
wider-covering
regulation
of
labor
practices,
codes
should
be
recognized
as
a
supplement
initiatives
rather
than
alternatives
to
traditional
regulatory
approaches
–
state
legislation
and
international
law.
Law scholar (Zumbansen,2006) uses theconceptof
‘‘transnational
law’’
–
the
specific
regulatory
mix
of
formal,
hard,
public
regulation,
and
informal,
soft,
private
regulation
–
to
capture
the
supplemental
relations between state labor regulation and codes of
conduct. On the one hand, emerging in the absence of
effective state regulation in the ‘‘deregulation’’ reality
under
neoliberal
globalization,
codes
have
great
po-
tential
in
extending
the
application
of
globally
rec-
ognized
labor
standards
across
national
boundaries,
across
governmental
jurisdictions
and
along
global
supply chains. On the other hand, national legislations
and international laws have particularly crucial role to
play in regulating labor practices where codes turned
to
be
obviously
ineffective,
because
of
their
volun-
tariness and inadequate coverage.
Notes
1
Rodriguez-Garavito,(2005),
p.
204.
2
Some
widely
cited
and
recent
studies
include
Drumwright
and
Murphy
(2001),
Godfrey
and
Hatch,
(2007),
Margolis
and
Walsh,(2001),
Marom,
(2006),
Orlitzky,
et
al.
(2003),
and
Sen
and
Bhattacharya
(2001).
3
According
to
an
extensive
review
of
1682
English
news
reports
conducted
by
Sethi
(2003),
athletic
foot-
wear
industry
had
the
worst
record,
accounting
for
over
50%
of
total
number
of
negative
new
reports
on
sweat-
shops
and
human
rights
abuses
in
global
factories
over
1994–2002.
4
During
the
1990s,
all
top
branded
merchandisers
dominating
global
athletic
footwear
industry,
such
as
Nike,
Reebok,
Adidas,
New
Balance,
Puma,
Asics,
Fila,
Kappa,
Lotto
and
Umbro
adopted
corporate
codes
of
conduct
or
sourcing
policy
to
monitor
labor
practices
of
their
overseas
suppliers.
See
Tulder
and
Kolk
(2001,
p.
269–70),
Clean
Clothes
Campaign
(2004,
p.
78).
5
In
2003,
Reebok
became
one
of
five
winners
for
the
American
Apparel
&
Footwear
Association’s
‘‘Excellence
in
Social
Responsibility’’
Awards.
See
Haisley
(2003).
6
During
the
past
decade,
exceeding
other
low-wage
Asian
countries
such
as
Indonesia,
and
Thailand,
China
became
the
largest
manufacturing
powerhouse
of
global
athletic
footwear
industry.
It
is
estimated
that
China
produced
80%
of
the
world’s
sports
shoes
and
the
ex-
ports
value
reached
US$625
million
in
2003.
See
‘‘Chi-
na
Produces
80%
of
the
World’s
Sports
Shoes
and
although
their
Prices
are
Virtually
Unbeatable.’’
Business
Wire
,
October
13,
2005.
7
According
to
Sethi
(2003)’s
news
analysis,
China
continued
to
top
the
list,
accounting
for
approximately
one-fourth
of
total
number
of
Western
news
reports
on
sweatshops
abuses.
8
‘‘Adidas
Steps
Up
to
Buy
Reebok
for
$3.8
Bil-
lion.’’
Los
Angeles
Times
,
August
4,
2005.
9
Reebok
International
Ltd.,
‘‘Annual
Report
2004’’,
See
http://www.reebok.com/useng/ir/financial/
default.htm
10
‘‘Reebok
to
honor
4
rights
activists.’’
The
Boston
Globe
,
March
7,
2005.
11
For
details
content
of
‘‘Reebok
Human
Rights
Production
Standards’’
see
Reebok,
2001.
‘‘A
Guide
to
the
Implementation
of
the
Reebok
Human
Rights
Pro-
duction
Standards.’’
12
‘‘Political
activists
rejects
award
from
shoe
firm.’’
The
Independent
,
February
8,
2002.
13
‘‘Reebok
and
American
Center
for
International
Labor
Solidarity
Partner
in
Labor
Rights
Training
for
Workers
in
Indonesia.’’
Business
Wir
e,
April
6,
1999.
14
‘‘Reebok
follows
fashion
for
confessions.’’
The
Guardian
(London)
,
October
19,
1999.
15
‘‘Sole-Searching.’’
Footwear
News
Sole
to
Sole
Supple-
ment
,
May
19,
1997.
Impact
of
Corporate
Code
of
Conduct
on
Labor
Standards
527
16
Reebok
International
Ltd.,
‘‘Annual
Report
2004’’,
See
http://www.reebok.com/useng/ir/financial/
default.htm
17
Interview
with
Reebok
Human
Rights
Manager
in
China,
December
2004.
18
http://www.reebok.com/Static/global/initiatives/
rights/business/source_perspect.html
19
Sporting
Goods
Manufacturers
Association
(SGMA),
2000,
‘‘US
Athletic
Footwear
Market
Today
2000’’;
SGMA,
2001,
‘‘US
Athletic
Footwear
Market
Today
2001’’;
‘‘Athletic
shoe
sales
rise
in
2001.’’
Foot-
wear
News
,
March
11,
2002;
‘‘Rivals
scramble
to
topple
Nike’s
sneaker
supremacy.’’
USA
Today
,
April
3,
2003;
‘‘News
Digest.’’
Rubber
&
Plastics
News
,
May
2,
2005.
20
Interviews
with
Taiwanese
manager
of
FS,
October,
2002.
21
Conner,
2001,
p.50.
22
Interview
with
Reebok
Human
Rights
Manager
in
China,
December,
2004.
23
Fazhi
Ribao
[Legality
Daily],
November
24,
2005.
24
Jingji
Ribao
[Economy
Daily],
July
10,
1995;
Fuj-
ian
Ribao
[Fujian
Daily],
July
6,
2005.
25
China
Trade
Union
Constitution
(2003,
Article
29)
and
Fujian
Province
Foreign
Funded
Enterprise
Trade
Union
Regulation
(2003,
Article
12).
26
Connor
(2001),
Sum
and
Pun
(2005).
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Division
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E-mail:
shellymyu@yahoo.com.cn
Impact
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Code
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Conduct
on
Labor
Standards
529
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